23rd German Savings Banks Conference: Keynote speech by the President of the Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband Heinrich Haasis

05.05.2010 – Speech

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

After nearly three years of crisis, the financial sector and policymakers are now again confronted with major challenges. Recent developments in the financial markets have clearly shown that what is missing so fundamentally is trust. Trust is the basis for everything we do in the financial sector. It is the foundation for the financial markets.

The financial sector will only
•    be efficient in the long term,
•    create sustainable economic prosperity, and
•    find acceptance in society,
if it captures the trust of people.

Today, 2,500 decision-makers from savings banks, municipal owners and associated companies of the Savings Banks Finance Group have gathered here in Stuttgart. All of you share the conviction that the banking business is more than just earning money. All of you know from your own experience that – more than other banks – the savings banks have assumed responsibility in the financial crisis and justified the trust placed in them. And all of you share the expectation that the right conclusions will be drawn from the crisis – not only in our own sector but also in the political arena. This is the theme of this Savings Banks Conference 2010.

I.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at the Savings Banks Conference 2007 in Bochum, we already dealt with the international financial markets at great length. At the time, we drew attention – and certainly not for the first time – to the stability risks associated with changes in the financing culture. And we strongly criticised the economic system’s growing focus on short-term profit maximisation. We alerted everyone to the fact that this might lead to a bubble. And we alerted everyone to the fact that companies were working with less and less equity and ever more debt.

At the time, many players in our sector did not want to listen. They were convinced that the financial sector was a growth driver and would create new wealth indefinitely. Some suggested – very much in keeping with Noble Prize winner Milton Friedman – that a company’s only social responsibility was to increase profits.  And others even believed that municipal welfare-oriented savings banks were an old model about to be phased out. Savings banks – for investment bankers, this sounds like a local railway in an age of supersonic aircraft. Savings bank employees – this smacked of banker wannabes. And the fact that savings banks are focused on the regions in which they are based – this sounded like provincialism.

For years we have argued against seeing everything exclusively from the limited perspective of the capital markets. Our goal has always been to promote public welfare – against the resistance of some people who referred to our approach as “social romanticism”. We have had many disputes – with the EU, with international institutions such as the IMF, with some academics, along with quite a few disputes with self-proclaimed modernisers from the political arena. We had to fight the spirit of the times. To be precise, we had to go against what interested groups had declared to be the spirit of the times. In our own ranks, there were some who asked whether we could win such a fight in the long run. There were doubts. And there were some among us who would rather have been investment bankers than “saving bankers”.

It is regrettable that billions of public capital had to be destroyed before everyone understood that this zeitgeist was wrong. The system of savings banks operating under the trusteeship of local governments and in the specific region of their local municipality was right at the time and still is right today: This has ensured that savings banks stay in touch with reality and concentrate on real customer business. Having a decentralised organisation and local financial responsibility is a viable approach: For this reason, savings did not invest their capital in international markets but in valuable local lending commitments. And developing, under one brand, a mutually supportive community of independent institutions which share the same philosophy and operate a joint liability scheme has also been a viable approach. This has provided security to our customers. While we certainly had not anticipated the magnitude of the financial crisis, we have been able to give the right answer with the savings banks’ business model.

Nevertheless, it would be completely wrong if we complacently leaned back, satisfied with our own fundamental beliefs. No – we are part of the overall financial sector and, as such, are subject to regulation. For this reason, we have to struggle to ensure that our business philosophy will be given the right position in the organisational scheme of the future. And we must see to it that the experience of the financial crisis will actually be translated into structures and rules.

This will not happen by itself; instead, it will be a major challenge because what we are confronted with is a very fundamental crisis of the legitimacy of and the trust in the financial sector. In Germany alone, taxpayers have had to provide € 28 billion in direct capital infusion and € 146 billion in guarantees to stabilise some banks. Due to the capital market development that was prompted by the crisis, many investors have lost substantial amounts of money. And many German companies have lost sales and earnings of an unprecedented magnitude. A decline of 5 per cent in the gross domestic product in 2009 speaks for itself.

I can understand that, against this background, many German citizens have very serious doubts with regard to the financial sector. And they do not always distinguish between different types of banks as they should. The German public and the companies in Germany expect that a repetition of such a crisis will be prevented or – let’s be more cautious – that it should at least become much less likely. I cannot think of any sensible reason why tax money should be spent to help the international financial sector to continue to do the things that have brought about the crisis. However, I can think of many reasons why the sector should be prevented from doing these things. For this reason, we will have to change the rules as well as the structures of the international financial sector.

II.

Many of the analyses that have been made – in particular those conducted by the financial sector itself – have come to the conclusion that the financial crisis was due to a chain of unfortunate developments:

•    an overly lax US money policy,
•    the lack of transparency with regard to many financial products,
•    inadequate lending standards, in particular in the United States,
•    insufficient risk management systems,
•    lack of supervision,
•    misjudgements by the rating agencies,
•    and lack of expertise in some banks.

No one will deny that all of these factors played an important role. However, I think that there are two key issues that do not get the attention they deserve: the issue of responsibility and that of moral standards. This raises the question as to the foundation on which the trust in our sector is actually based on, and what we have to do to preserve this trust.

What in fact is the purpose of banks? If we asked an investment banker this question, he would be surprised about the alleged naivety and draw attention to the opportunity to earn money, a lot of money! If we asked this question to our customers, they would give quite different answers. Investors would certainly expect that a bank would find the right form of investment for them. They would expect that they would at any rate get their money back at the end of the maturity period, if possible with an adequate return on investment. Loan customers would expect that the right to collect capital would be associated with an obligation, i.e. the obligation to make this capital available to the market for investments that make sense. They would assume that the bank would be a reliable partner at their side, at least for the agreed period. Both investors and loan customers would expect that a bank would always have extensive knowledge of the market, which it should not only use to increase its own profits but also to the benefit of its customers. To dispel any doubts, customers would expect that those who handle their money or manage their economic future would be subject to stringent rules and strict supervision. All of this taken together is the basis for the trust which customers place in their banks. Or in other words: Actually, what we offer is essentially trust!

This has something to do with the concept of the ‘honourable merchant’, which only appears to be old-fashioned. An honourable merchant is someone who fully understands that business transactions will only be good in the long term if both parties benefit from them. Business transactions in which it is clear that the customer will always lose are not suitable for such an honourable merchant. “Quality is doing what is decent”, as Germany’s former President Theodor Heuss once said.

What the financial crisis has revealed is that large parts of the financial sector are not really able to meet these customer expectations: Instead of making their superior expertise available to customers, they use it to develop obscure financial products. Instead of making the capital they collect available for sensible investments of other customers, they use it to speculate in the international financial markets. Instead of supporting their loan customers throughout the agreed term of the loan, they sell these loans and thus abscond from the responsibility for their own lending decisions. And in many cases, they are not subject to effective rules or supervision.

Over many years, representatives of our sector also put pressure on policymakers to abolish regulation and to expose everything to the mechanisms of the capital markets. In his enthusiasm about this development, the spokesman of a big German bank and former representative of the Association of German Banks referred to the capital markets as the “fifth power”  – i.e. in addition to the legislative, the executive, the judiciary and the media. He even recommended that, in the 21st century, the decisions of policymakers should mainly be guided by the wishes of the financial markets.

Many companies that are engaged in the provision of finance have reduced their equity capital base and have increased the share of debt in investments more and more in the interest of achieving a high return on equity. The CEO of a large US bank put it like this: “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”  Actually, however, this was nothing else but worshipping the golden calf in the form of short-term return on equity.

I still remember talks I had with rating agencies shortly after I became President of the German Savings Bank Association four years ago. Believe it or not: They actually suggested at the time that the main problem of the savings banks was that they had too much equity. They recommended that we introduce a centralised treasury and buy triple-A papers on a large scale in the international financial markets. Just imagine what would have happened if we had followed their advice …

All of this was a fundamental mistake which led many to overextend their debt: including the millions of US consumers who were not creditworthy and had no equity and were still granted loans on a large scale; the players in the financial sector who took risks that were completely out of proportion with their own equity, in some cases by making use of off-balance-sheet designs; and including many countries whose overindebted budgets can only be consolidated with great difficulty today. What has been forgotten too often is to practise moderation, i.e. first save and then invest. What has been overlooked in many instances is that a good merchant thinks and invests long-term. And what has been underestimated all too often is that all debts will have to be repaid one day.

Of course, the rules imposed by the banking regulator have always stipulated a minimum equity share. However, in practice, these rules have been systematically circumvented – in some cases even with the support of policymakers. I am referring not least to the completely exaggerated use of securitisation and structured products. Such risks can certainly be a good and efficient way to diversify risks. However, problems arise when these instruments are used to shift the responsibility for one’s own lending decisions to third parties, and when one’s own responsibility becomes blurred by repeated tranching and changes in the composition of loans, also referred to as “structuring”.

All this happened on a large scale and in an uncontrolled fashion. This has led to a system of collective irresponsibility. Losses were nationalised worldwide via the capital markets, ultimately down to the level of the taxpayer. In this context, it has also proven to be an illusion to expect that rating agencies with their assessments would be able to create the transparency that some of the arrangers had very deliberately blurred. For this reason, one should be very careful when reviving such systems today. And one should be even more careful if such products are to be accompanied by governmental guarantees, as some representatives of the banking sector have requested over and over again. Instead, financial derivatives should only be traded on public stock exchanges, as Germany’s President proposed last week.

However, I think that we would be taking things too lightly if we were to limit our discussion on responsibilities to the financial institutions where losses became manifest at the end of the day. While I can understand this discussion, I think it is equally important to speak about those who carelessly grant credits and then quickly sell them. And it is important to speak about those who structure such non-valuable loans and put them into circulation. And most importantly, we have to speak about those who – on an irresponsible scale and in isolation from the underlying transaction – issue loan insurance products which, in the final analysis, are bets. Anyone who wants to prevent financial crises in the future will have to put a damper on such speculative transactions!

III.

The business community and policymakers in Germany can rightly be proud about the fact that they contained the effects of the financial crisis in Germany through close cooperation. In this context, I would like to mention the rapid provision of liquidity by the ECB, the very helpful funds made available for short-time work by the German government, the wise strategy pursued by many companies to retain their workforce, and the very responsible behaviour of works councils and the trade unions. However, all of this might be quickly put at risk in the event of new instability in the financial markets.

Like many others, I had hoped that, after the G20 summit meetings, the world’s most important industrialised nations would be prepared to draw the necessary conclusions and regulate the financial markets at the right places. Instead, the well-known differences in interests have come to light again. Day by day, it is less and less likely that the necessary changes will materialise.

This is dangerous because there are considerable risk factors in the markets: During the financial crisis, the “fire” had to be fought by starting a “backfire” – with enormous liquidity volumes. This backfire is still burning. Since there is substantial liquidity in the market, there is growing willingness again to take high risks and to accept excessive debt. In the international financial sector, there is an incentive and there is pressure to utilise the surplus capacity that still exists by engaging in speculative transactions. And in the final analysis, it has been mainly big financial institutions that have benefited from government liability. I am afraid that this experience might once again promote careless and irresponsible behaviour. In many internationally oriented banks, the very strong business performance in 2009 is once again primarily due to pure-play financial market and investment banking transactions, instead of real customer business. All this is bad news are in terms of the stability of the financial markets.

The issue that is in the limelight these days is Greece. There is no alternative at all to restoring Greece’s credit-worthiness. It is in Germany’s own interest. The faster this happens, the lower the consequential losses.

Since the 1990s, savings banks have made enormous efforts to build up confidence in the common European currency. At the time, we believed in the stability of the euro – and we still do today! And in fact, the common European currency furnished proof of its stability for many years. Even today, the euro is worth more, relative to the US dollar, than the deutschmark was when it was phased out. If this stability is to be maintained, the budgetary targets laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht will have to be taken seriously by all the euro countries; and they will have to be strictly monitored, and if necessary, the targets have to be enforced with a broader range of instruments.

However, what is required in the current situation to safeguard the stability of the euro is to convince the creditors of euro countries – and this is not just limited to Greece – that they can safely invest their money in euro bonds, i.e. that they will get their money back. For this reason, it is very dangerous to take into consideration defaults, writing off loans, member states leaving the monetary union, let alone state insolvencies. If such options are considered, this will only support the business of those who want to spur on the crisis with their speculative financial transactions and earn money in the process.

IV.

The case of Greece demonstrates once again how important it is to have effective rules that will contain dangerous speculation. The best thing for the stability of the financial market is to have structures and transactions that are stable in themselves and through which market players can be managed and, if necessary, protected by their own efforts. Such structures deserve the confidence of customers and the unconditional support of policymakers and regulatory authorities.

The financial crisis has shown that the decentralised, customer-oriented networks of the savings banks and of the cooperative banks
•    were stable in themselves,
•    fully lived up to their responsibility to provide finance for the remainder of the economy and even increased their lending volumes,
•    continued to achieve a decent business performance,
•    and even paid taxes amounting to more than one billion euros during the years of the crisis.

This means that there is no need for any additional regulation with regard to the decentralised systems! What’s more, we tell policymakers not only in Germany – at regional and federal level – but also in the European Union that, after this experience, we expect that we will finally get strong support for our structures in the interest of our private and business customers.

Of course, we do not expect that the entire international financial sector will now be modelled after the German savings banks. Our country also needs banks with internationally oriented business models. However, it must be clear that such business models pose potentially higher stability risks. 

In the interest of the stability of the financial market, it does not make sense to require more equity for loans granted to small and medium-sized businesses. This would even be harmful with regard to safeguarding credit supply. And it is also not necessary to demand more equity from institutions which, because of their size and the type of their transactions, are not at all capable of compromising the stability of the national economy. Such higher equity requirements should mainly apply to those financial institutions which, because of their size and risk appetite, pose a risk for the entire national economy if they run into difficulties.

At present, the big banks are getting bigger, and their number is growing. Actually, there is no vested right to infinitely large banks. And there is no need for mega-banks either. Many of these institutions have to scaled back, the sector as a whole will have to shrink: that would be the right conclusion. Because what will happen if an institution that is relevant for the system runs into difficulty? Of course, the home state will have to intervene by providing government funding.

In Germany, policymakers are currently in the process of introducing even more binding government liability. They want to set up a stability fund – fed from fiscal charges – which will come to the rescue of banks that are relevant for the system in the event of a crisis. Now everyone knows that a fiscal charge that will be affordable for the banks will not be sufficient in the long term to provide the necessary funds in the event of a systemic crisis. This means that such a fiscal charge will be the price that the banks that are relevant for the system will pay in return for a kind of government liability. In that case, however, they should also pay a premium for this type of state liability. A stability fund should be financed by those who will need it in the event of a crisis. This does not apply to savings banks and cooperative banks: They have their own effective protection schemes for member institutions. They do not need any government funds, and their customers have never lost any money. So, why should savings banks and cooperative banks mount a liability network so that other banks can continue to pursue their speculative transactions unchecked?

V.

Of course, we also have to accept our own responsibility. This also applies to the Landesbanken. Let’s not beat around the bush: Some banks from our Group could not resist the temptation of making fast profits in the international financial markets. They themselves and their local government sponsors have had to pay dearly for this.

However, I also believe that, after months of sharp criticism, it is now time to finally make a fair assessment of the role of the Landesbanken. I would like to begin by stating that, contrary to public perception, quite a number of Landesbanken came through the crisis quite well and fully lived up to their responsibilities within our national economy. And something else we should not forget is that the Landesbanken account for a total of approx. 20 per cent of the entire corporate lending volume in Germany. Anyone who – given these facts – suggests in discussions that the best thing would be if the Landesbanken disappeared from the market as quickly as possible, not only harms the banks concerned but also – and more importantly – harms our national economy and German companies.

Like other banks, the Landesbanken will only be able to rebuild trust if they assume responsibility. There are mainly two specific points to be considered in this context: How do they deal with the problems that have arisen? And what conclusions will they draw for the future?

Whenever problems occurred, the savings banks provided fresh capital, assumed additional liability or simply lost their property to the regional governments. In other words, they accepted their responsibility and spent billions of euros. Allow me to make this comparison: Did private banks behave in the same way? The major private shareholder did not provide any additional capital for Hypo Real. Instead, the German government paid off the private shareholder above the current share price. And there was another private institution for which the German government provided about three times as much capital as the bank was worth in the stock market; nevertheless, roughly 75 per cent of the shares are still held by private shareholders today. And the billions of interest due on the German government’s silent contribution have not been paid either.

I also know that, for legal reasons, shareholders of private banks cannot be obliged to make further capital contributions or to assume additional liability. It is therefore one of the paradoxical results of this financial crisis that the private banks leave their losses to the government while the public-sector banks have proven to be responsible owners.

One of the most important conclusions that we must draw for the future from what we have experienced is that the Landesbanken should be anchored more firmly again in the real economy while risk assets in the international financial business – such as credit substitute transactions – should be significantly reduced. This is what is currently happening. And it does not have to be wrong just because it is based on requirements imposed by Brussels. It is regrettable that we did not manage to do this earlier on our own and based on our own judgement. Such drastic reductions would be necessary at many points in the international financial system. However, they are currently limited – almost exclusively – to the Landesbanken sector.

Nevertheless, we cannot stop there. The question of achieving additional cost synergies and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Landesbanken will be on the agenda as soon as the current burdens from the financial crisis have been worked off. Because the savings banks want the Landesbanken to be partners who give them optimum support by supplying products from the Savings Banks Finance Group for their customers and by giving full support to their corporate customers in international transactions. They want Landesbanken to be partners within the Savings Banks Finance Group whose business policy they can assess and whose risks they can endorse.

The Landesbanken, in turn, must be strongly interested in having a link to the retail market through independent savings banks in order to secure their funding. For this reason, I believe that we should, step by step, tackle a further consolidation of the Landesbanken sector. I know that this will require staying power. And it is also clear that it will be necessary to come to an understanding with state-level governments in Germany because they are co-owners of the Landesbanken. We want to achieve this in harmony. Of course, we realise that there are some Landesbanken in which the savings banks have very minor share of the entrepreneurial responsibility today. If state-level governments decided to sell such banks to third parties, we would respect this. This would also be a way to reduce capacity within our own Group. For us, it would be important to discuss such plans in a spirit of fair partnership and then jointly to draw the necessary conclusions.

VI.

The savings banks must also draw conclusions from the financial crisis. I have already pointed out that the structures – i.e. the system of savings banks operating under the trusteeship of local governments, as decentralised entities and in the specific region of their local municipality – once again proved to be very effective during the crisis.

Of course, it would be easy now to slap ourselves on the back and to see ourselves as the better people and the better bankers. I do not want to step on anyone’s toes, but it was not only better judgement but also the structures that prevented us from making the mistakes made by some of the big banks. For this reason, it is so important that these structures will continue to be protected against any attempts at softening them. We need a continuation of the clear commitment to the trusteeship of local governments – and here I am also addressing Schleswig-Holstein, where the regional legislator has taken the risk of allowing private investors to enter savings banks. We also need the decentralised setup, i.e. savings banks that act as independent local entrepreneurs. Any discussion about forming integrated groups composed of Landesbanken and savings banks should have ceased, at last since the financial crisis. It would certainly be an odd conclusion if the assets of the savings banks were used in integrated groups for international financial transactions.

However, what we have increasingly noticed is that maintaining the decentralised setup requires close cooperation within the Savings Banks Finance Group. A decentralised setup and units of a manageable size on the one hand, and a role as a market leader in an internationally networked national economy on the other hand: Both can only be brought together by the Savings Banks Finance Group – with savings banks operating at local level and efficient specialised member institutions operating at international level.

Savings banks will only be able to continue to operate independently at local level in the long run if they are willing to be part of a system based on solidarity, with a common brand and a mutual obligation to meet claims. This requires self-discipline, respect for the interests of the others and the awareness that any misguided developments in one place will always and immediately have repercussions on all the others. A regional focus must therefore not be a protective shield for inefficiency, for safeguarding local or regional interests at the expense of the others, or for experiments with a common brand. I therefore think that making our philosophy more binding internally is the right thing to do. This may serve to strengthen the trust that all member institutions will contribute to the benefit of the common brand with their business policies.

All these are important framework conditions for us as public and independent savings banks. It is up to each and every one of us to fill this framework in the right way – in a way that
•    meets the expectations of the institutions under whose trusteeship we operate, usually municipal and rural local governments,
•    justifies the customers’ trust and
•    maintains the stabilising role of the savings banks for our national economy in the long term.

All of this will only be possible if savings banks can rely on a sound financial footing. This requires a successful performance in the market. All of our thinking must therefore be focused on finding a convincing answer to the question as to why a consumer should want to be a customer of a savings bank. There are mainly three factors that matter: Particularly good advice, service and products; an understandable, credible business policy; and highly qualified, motivated staff.

In fact, customers usually do not go to a bank in order to buy a very specific product. Instead, they expect solutions for their investment, pension or financing needs. Our future success will therefore primarily depend on the quality of the advice we give. Customers can expect that the business relationship with their bank should be centred on their needs and their personal circumstances, in particular their personal risk appetite and their risk-bearing capacity. Listening, understanding the wishes of customers and then recommending the right products – that is what it is all about. This includes in particular informing customers extensively about the modes of action and the risks of securities, which also means that the costs and commissions involved must be disclosed. We want transparency because only then will customers have trust in us. We have reiterated these principles at the Savings Banks Conference. We did so for our customers, so that they know what advice they can expect from a savings bank – but also for our own staff, so that they always abide by these standards.

I also know that we have to earn 10 billion euros annually just to cover the cost of our 130,000 customer service consultants. This can only be achieved if our customers feel that the service we provide is really worth this amount. To this end, our customers must sense that the advice they receive from a savings bank is more than high-pressure selling in network marketing.

However, there are also products that are simple and where the price therefore plays a key role for many customers. As far as these products are concerned, we will have to significantly improve the service for our customers and make much greater use of the new media. I am not primarily referring to old-style online banking. In future, mobile devices will be used for banking transactions. We are currently establishing ourselves as the market and innovation leader in this field. And we do not intend to abandon this position in the future.

The second very important point is a business policy that is understandable and credible for the customer. With the business strategy pursued by savings banks, we committed ourselves last year to making customer satisfaction one of our most important corporate objectives. With this strategy, we demonstrate that our corporate objective is not to run after abstract returns on equity; instead, our business policies are centred on the customer.

However, as a consequence of the financial crisis, customers also expect an impeccable ethical conduct. For this reason, we shoud make it clear that making an investment with a savings bank is not the same thing as making an investment with a “distance bank”. Deposits made in savings banks are used to grant loans for companies or for infrastructure projects in the same region – loans that help the investor, his family or his neighbours to find jobs; loans that promote the development and the quality of life in the depositor’s own region. Such deposits enable the savings banks to make profits, from which the depositors’ own region once again benefits through taxes, investments and sponsoring commitments. I am very grateful to you, the members of boards of management and administrative boards, for once again significantly increasing the savings banks’ public welfare dividend – i.e. their financial commitment to social, cultural and sports causes. In fact, in 2009 the amount spent increased by 17 per cent to € 519 million, which we can be very proud of. Such benefits are more than just sponsorship – they are part of the savings banks’ birth certificate!

The third point, which is very important to me, refers to our employees. We have 250,000 highly qualified employees in the savings banks. Every day, we provide qualified advice to far more than 100,000 customers; day after day, we provide important services to millions of our customers. Our employees are the savings banks’ face to the customer. They breathe life into the “savings bank” brand. They make a difference and offset us from our competitors! Our employees need quality management, opportunities to upgrade their skills and motivation.

Our figures show very clearly that the success of a savings bank does not depend on its size; nor does it depend on the region in which it operates or the local purchasing power. Instead, the key factors are the employees’ competence and the quality of the management. What it takes are clearly defined objectives, dedication and a motivating corporate culture that is characterised by trust. And what it also takes – and this is very important to me – is setting an example. This applies to all of us – associations, board members and all those who bear responsibility within our Group. It is important that our customers can recognise the philosophy of the savings banks and that we see ourselves as part of a local community that shares responsibility.

This requires self-confidence and modesty at the same time. Self-confidence because the savings banks
•    enjoy more trust than any other provider of banking services in Germany,
•    are the most important finance partner for individuals and businesses in this country,
•    have contributed more than € 20 billion euros in taxes for our state – more than any other company, and
•    provide the largest number of business jobs and training slots in our country.

At the same time, however, we should be modest because we know that we depend on and with our customers, and that we are part of a local family as service providers for our own region and its citizens.

 
Savings banks stand for
•    sustainable economic success,
•    practical local responsibility,
•    first and foremost, however, a humane and responsible form of banking.

That is what we work toward. That is how we want to create trust. We are convinced that, backed by the trust of our customers and of the local governments under whose trusteeship we operate, we can look forward to a successful future. Thank you very much for your attention!